embraced at the time, either by the Obama Administration or by Congressional lawmakers. 8 Indeed, influential members of the Obama Administration, including Tim Geithner and Larry Summers, actively resisted the Volcker rule, believing that Dodd--Frank's new provisions governing systemically important institutions were sufficient to control risky bank behavior. 9 As the effects of the economic recession lingered into 2010 and public discontent continued unabated, however, Administration officials reportedly began to reevaluate Paul Volcker's proposals to limit bank proprietary trading and fund activity. On January 21, 2010, President Obama, with Paul Volcker by his side, publicly announced his support for the Volcker rule. 10 In other words, the Volcker rule originated as a political concession.
Dismissed by critics (including economists within the Obama administration) as unnecessary and unwieldy, it nonetheless became a key tool in a package of reforms designed to placate Wall Street critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to contain risky financial institution behavior. As will be discussed in the following section, however, for both practical and political reasons the Volcker rule that emerged from the legislature left key contested issues unresolved and delegated broad authority to federal agencies, ensuring that debates about the proper scope of the rule continued into the rulemaking phase. 8 Group Of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework For Regulatory Stability (2009) , available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30 Report.pdf. 9 Skeel, supra note 7, at 54-57; John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama's Economic Adviser and His Battles over the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25, 27. 10 Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform (Jan. 21, 2010) , available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the--press--office/remarks--president--financial--reform.
III. FROM STATUTE TO PROPOSED RULE -THE PRE--NPRM PERIOD

A. Text
Subject to important exceptions, the Volcker rule prohibits "banking entities" (a defined term) from engaging in proprietary trading and from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund. Although systemically important nonbanks may continue to engage in these activities, they must carry additional capital and comply with other restrictions in order to do so, rendering the rule of interest to many large nonbank entities as well. constitute an important part of the financial system, including market making, underwriting, hedging, and customer service. Effective Volcker rule implementation 11 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2010). 12 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Gao--11--529, Proprietary Trading: Regulators Will Need More Comprehensive Information To Fully Monitor Compliance With New Restrictions When Implemented 16 (2011) , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11529.pdf. and enforcement thus requires differentiating forbidden proprietary trading activity from these permitted behaviors.
And therein lies much of the political tension and practical difficulty surrounding the Volcker rule. Critics warn that overly broad definitions or enforcement will curtail valuable efforts at market making or customer service, especially in thin markets, reducing market liquidity and impairing other beneficial functions performed by many banking entities. Supporters, in contrast, worry that regulated entities will seek to disguise risky proprietary activity as a permitted exemption, and urge the agencies to narrowly interpret statutory exemptions and strictly enforce the proprietary trading ban. 13 In sum, the Volcker rule, like many Dodd-Frank provisions, entered the administrative process both highly incomplete and highly contested. The federal agencies charged with rulemaking under the statute would play a substantial role in shaping the final policy outcomes and would likely do so under the continued watchful eye of affected industry members and other interested parties.
B. Meetings
Efforts to influence the Volcker rule at the agency level began immediately after presidential signing. As part of the new transparency efforts associated with Dodd-Frank implementation, the Volcker Agencies, together with the Treasury Department, began disclosing their contacts regarding Dodd-Frank shortly after the 13 See infra notes 28--33 and accompanying text (discussing these arguments in more detail).
bill was signed into law in July 2010. 14 These logs give some insight into the work of Dodd-Frank statutory interpretation and implementation that goes on behind closed doors. They also demonstrate the extent to which unresolved debates about the proper scope of the Volcker rule's application and exemptions, many of which remain unresolved today, continued into the rulemaking phase. 
C. Comment Letters
It is unusual, though not unheard of, to request written public feedback prior to rule proposal. For example, federal agencies sometimes issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit feedback prior to drafting a proposed rule. 16 The Volcker rule, however, did not follow this pattern. Although the Volcker agencies did not issue an ANPRM, Dodd--Frank required the newly formed Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to conduct a study and make recommendations on effective Volcker rule implementation not later than six months after the date of statute enactment. 17 Pursuant to that directive, beginning on October 6, 2010, FSOC solicited public input for a thirty--day period in advance of the study. 18 We thus have a record of public comment activity prior to the Volcker rule NPRM, giving an additional window into agency--level lobbying from the earliest stages of Volcker rule development. 16 Office of the Federal Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, "How does an agency involve the public in developing a proposed rule?" https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf. 17 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2010). 18 Funds, 75 Federal Register 61758 (October 6, 2010 ). 
Public Input for the Study Regarding the Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships With Hedge Funds and Private Equity
A. Meetings
During the period between Oct. 11, 2011, the date of the NPRM, and December 10, 2013, the date of final rule issuance, there were 947 meetings with federal agencies to discuss the Volcker rule, as shown in Table 1 . Of these, as shown in Figure 4 , the vast majority of meetings were with financial institutions and their representatives (law and consulting firms and industry trade groups), followed by members of other affected industries, such as asset management and insurance companies, and their trade associations, law, and consulting firms.
Although nonindustry voices were represented, they were far less numerous, both as compared to industry voices and as compared to their representation in the comment letter analysis discussed in Part IV.B, below. Roughly 11% of meetings were held with public interest groups, less than 2% with academics, and just under 5% with foreign (3.1%) and domestic (.3%) government entities and members of congress or their staff (1.3%). Though the percentage of meetings commanded by nonindustry stakeholders is relatively small, as is evident from the side--by--side comparison in Table 1 , both public interest groups and academics command a larger share of meetings in the post--NPRM period, as compared to the pre--NPRM period.
Moreover, foreign and state governments are seen only in the post--NPRM data, suggesting that the Volcker Agencies had access to a wider range of viewpoints during the post--NPRM period than in the pre--NPRM phase.
B. Comments
The unusually high volume of comment letter activity seen during the Volcker rule pre--NPRM phase carried though to the post--NPRM phase. As shown by Table 3 , the Volcker Agencies received nearly 18,500 comments during the post--NPRM period. Letters from private individuals far outpace participation by any other group, representing 98% of total letters received (n=18,109).
As was the case during the pre--NPRM period, however, the vast majority of comments are form letters from the general public. This is demonstrated by Table 3 and Figure 5 .A. -of the 18,450 letters received, only 381 (or just over 2%) were unique, as opposed to form, letters. 24 Although individuals were the most frequent users of form letters, submitting three different varieties totaling 18,039 comments, we also identified the use of form letters by affected industry members, specifically insurance companies and venture capital firms.
Looking only at unique comment letters, shown in figure 5 .B., although industry players dominate, private individual and congressional member comments are nearly as numerous. Moreover, public interest groups, academics, foreign and state governments, and others also provided unique comment letters.
C. Content
What issues were being raised in these letters? The Agencies themselves provide much information on this question, in Attachment B to the Adopting Release of the final rule. 25 This information is selective, however, and does not provide a systematic and inclusive account of comment letter content. We, therefore, systematically coded the comment letters for content, using sorting software to analyze the results. We were interested not only in the types of issues raised and the changes to the rule suggested, but also in which types of commenters made which suggestions, and what sort of persuasive tactics they employed. Elsewhere, we discuss this analysis in more detail. 26 Here, however, we focus on the issue most often raised by commenters -the market making exemption. 24 The Volcker Agencies counted 600 unique comment letters. We believe that our count is more accurate, however, as the agency count identifies some industry form The comments addressed all major provisions of the proposed Volcker rule. 27 The most commonly discussed substantive provision, however, as demonstrated by Table 4 , was the market--making exemption, which was addressed by nearly a third of all comment letters. Interest in the market--making exemption was broad--basedindeed, as illustrated by Table 5 , every commenter type, except venture capital firms, addressed the market making exemption in comments. Nonfinancial institution commenters raised the issue most often, with 80% of letters addressing market making. Financial institutions, foreign governments, public interest groups, and lobbying firms also commonly addressed the market making exemption, raising it in nearly half of letters.
These findings are consistent with the Volcker Agencies' own comment letter analysis, which noted "the Agencies received significant comment regarding the proposed market--making exemption." 28 Much of that commentary involved the impact of the exemption on financial markets, with commenters disagreeing, sometimes quite aggressively, about those impacts. For example, some commenters argued that the Volcker rule, as proposed, would limit bank's ability to engage in market making, with negative effects on market liquidity, price discovery, bid--ask spreads, and capital formation. 29 Others disputed these contentions. Some commenters, including Paul Volcker, argued that reduced market liquidity was a benefit, rather than a cost. 30 More commonly, however, commenters disputed the contention that the Volcker rule would reduce market liquidity, even if banks ultimately engaged in less market making activity. Some argued, for example, that to the extent the Volcker rule limited banks' ability to make markets, other entities not subject to the Volcker rule would pick up the slack. 31 Others argued that banks currently take liquidity from the 27 Attachment B, supra note 24 at 5. 28 Id. at 142. 29 Id. at 149--150. 30 See, e.g., Letter of Paul Volcker. 31 Attachment B, supra note 24 at 152 (discussing these comments). market, by attempting "to beat" other institutional investors, and that the Volcker rule would add some market liquidity, by prohibiting such opportunism. 32 Our analysis confirms this commenter interest in market liquidity issues. Table 4 , for example, shows that a full 40% of commenters raised concerns about the liquidity impacts of the Volcker rule -more than any other type of economic argument that was raised. Other frequently raised concerns included arguments about the general economic costs of the Volcker rule (32% of commenters) and concerns about systemic risk or too big to fail (normally raised by commenters writing in support of the Volcker rule).
As noted above, these concerns about the liquidity impacts of the Volcker rule are closely tied to debates about the scope of the market making exemption. As shown in Table 4 , some commenters (16, by our count) relied on or challenged (10 commenters) the findings of a study by Stanford economics professor Darrell Duffie commissioned by SIFMA, which enumerated a number of negative effects from the Volcker rule related to banks' impaired ability to engage in market making, including reduced liquidity and financial system stability. 33 
V. CONCLUSION
The Volcker rule has proven to be one of the most contested and protracted rulemaking tasks imposed by Dodd--Frank. Politicians, academics, market participants, and the general public continue to debate the rule's costs and benefits 32 Id. See also, John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L. J., 882, 974--78 (2015) (discussing the difficulty of assessing the costs of lost market liquidity stemming from the Volcker rule); Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 Boston College L. Rev. 469 (2013) (discussing the market making exemption and its potential liquidity effects in detail). 33 Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule (January 16, 2012) , available at http://www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/policy/duffievolckerrule.pdf. and will likely do so for some time to come. 34 As this article demonstrates, this contentiousness was presaged by the rule's political history.
The Volcker rule originated, not out of a deep Obama administration commitment to the provision, but as a political concession designed to placate Wall Street critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to contain risky financial institution behavior. In the face of deep divisions about the proper scope of the rule, it emerged from the legislature with key issues unresolved and delegated broad authority to federal agencies to determine the ultimate scope of the rule.
As a result, the Volcker rule, like many Dodd-Frank provisions, entered the administrative process both highly incomplete and highly contested, ensuring that debates about the proper scope of the statute's prohibitions continued into the rulemaking phase. Efforts to influence the Volcker rule at the agency level began immediately after presidential signing, through both meetings with Volcker agency personnel and letter writing campaigns. Those expressing an opinion on the Volcker rule's prohibitions included affected industry members, public interest groups, academics, and the general public, among others. This interest only intensified after the NPRM, when more than 18,000 separate commenters wrote in to express their views on the Volcker rule and concerned stakeholders continued face--to--face meetings with the Volcker Agencies.
It is thus not surprising that today, more than six years after the Group of 
